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WHO: World Health OrganizationThe current Ebola outbreak in West Africa has already caused
substantial mortality and dire human and economic
consequences. It continues to represent an alarming public
health threat in the region and beyond and jeopardizes the
provision of health care and other services in the affected
countries. The scale of the epidemic has accelerated research
efforts for diagnostics, treatment, and prevention galvanized
through increased availability of funding. Our knowledge
relating to the virus, disease pathogenesis, risk factors,
dynamics of transmission, and epidemic control is increasing,
and sociocultural factors have emerged as critical determinants
for the success and failure of control efforts. However, there is a
long way to go. In this review we summarize the current
knowledge, examine the sociocultural context in West Africa,
and outline priority areas for future research. (J Allergy Clin
Immunol 2015;135:856-67.)
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In March 2014, a new outbreak of Ebola virus (EV) was
identified in West Africa.1 Cases were first detected on the
border of Guinea Conakry with Sierra Leone and Liberia. Sub-
sequently, transmission became intense in these 3 countries,
and by the end of January 2015, it is still ongoing. Small
numbers of cases linked to the outbreak have also been identified
in neighboring countries, such as Senegal (n5 1), Nigeria (n5
20), and Mali (n 5 9). Cases have been exported to other coun-
tries outside Africa, and person-to-person transmission occurred
in Spain (n5 1) and the United States (n5 2). Simultaneously, a
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856Republic of Congo between July and October 2014.2 By the
end of January 2015, the outbreak in West Africa had accounted
for more than 22,000 cases and 8,800 deaths.3 Although trans-
mission seems to have slowed down in Liberia and Guinea Con-
akry, more than 50 new cases are still reported daily in Sierra
Leone.3
The current outbreak has unpredictable economic conse-
quences for the 3 deeply affected countries (Guinea Conakry,
Sierra Leone, and Liberia) and the region of West Africa as a
whole. Even in neighboring countries within the region, where
few or no cases have been reported, tourism (an important source
of income) has been heavily hampered while facilities for
potential Ebola cases have been prepared.
A serious shortage of timely resources in the region is one of the
key factors responsible for the disproportionate scale of the ongoing
epidemic in West Africa. Although international response
eventually occurred, it only arose when the epidemic was already
out of control and had been considered an international public
health threat.4 An additional trigger for the international response
was the appearance of cases in the United States and Europe.
Suddenly, it became obvious that Ebola poses an urgent threat not
only toWestAfrica but also to the international community at large.
This review aims to summarize the current scientific
knowledge relating to host and pathogen, to analyze drivers of
the current epidemic, and to discuss potential mitigation
strategies within their ethical and societal context.EPIDEMIOLOGY OF EBOLA OUTBREAKS IN AFRICA
The first human EV outbreak occurred in Zaire (now the
Democratic Republic of Congo) in 19765 and was named after the
nearby Ebola River. The same year, a similar outbreak with a
different EV species occurred in Sudan.6 Since 1976, more than
25 known outbreaks of EV have occurred in Africa, and 5
different EV species have been identified. Currently, EV
hemorrhagic fever remains a plague for the population of
equatorial Africa, with an increase in the numbers of outbreaks
and cases since 2000.7
The current EV outbreak in West Africa is the largest ever
recorded given the number of affected persons, countries
involved, and longest persistent transmission (Fig 1). The
FIG 1. Major Ebola outbreaks occurring in Africa from 1976 to 2014. Areas of bubbles represent numbers of
cases. Colors of bubbles represent countries: blue, Zaire/Congo; red, Sudan; yellow, Gabon; gray, Uganda;
multicolored, current outbreak with several countries involved.
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involved 425 persons, less than 2% of the affected subjects in
the current outbreak.7 Past outbreaks were confined to
relatively rural and isolated areas in Central Africa without
spreading to urban sectors, which facilitated the effective
intervention of control measures.5 The delay in identifying the
outbreak in urban settings in the current outbreak hindered
the timely and effective implementation of control efforts in the
region.
Other clinical and epidemiologic characteristics are similar
between past and ongoing EV epidemics. Mortality in patients
with EV is very high, with case/fatality ratios (CFRs) that range
from 41% to 89% depending on the virus strain.8-11 Although
initial numbers seemed to indicate that the CFR in the current
epidemic was lower than in previous outbreaks, initial
calculations did not account for delays between disease onset
and final outcome,9 and the sheer number of cases led to
underestimates of the overall mortality. Currently, the CFR
among all patients from whom a definitive outcome is recorded
is 72%, and it is slightly less for hospitalized patients (CFR,
60%).12 The incubation period has also been similar between
outbreaks, ranging from 2 to 21 days.8,13
Several mathematic models have attempted to compare the
average number of secondary infections per case (R0) in the past
and recent outbreaks. No significant differences in R0 at the start
of epidemics have been observed, ranging between 1.35 and
2.22.8,11,13-15 Major limitations of these models are that they
use different assumptions and rely on available data where
accuracy might be poor under epidemic conditions and can vary
between outbreaks and countries.CHARACTERISTICS OF EV
The genus Ebola are nonsegmented, negative-sense, single-
stranded RNA viruses of the Filoviridae family, which is coined
from the Latin word ‘‘filum,’’ meaning thread-like. The viral
particles form varying shapes of filaments with the RNAmolecule
encapsulated in a lipid membrane, allowing formation of new
particles on the surfaces of their host cells.16,17
Five subtypes of EVare known: Zaire, Sudan, Bundibugyo, Tai
Forest (formerly known as Co^te d’Ivoire), and Reston. Each
subtype was named after the site where it was first isolated. Since
1976, when EV was first described, the first 3 subtypes have beenresponsible for large outbreaks in Africa, with the Zaire strain
causing the most fatalities. The Reston subtype is largely
localized to the Western Pacific region. Despite being highly
pathogenic in nonhuman primates, it has not been reported to
cause illness in human subjects.18
Apart from EV, another member of the Filoviridae family is
Marburg virus, which is named after the city in Germany where it
was first discovered. EV and Marburg viruses share genome
organization and replication mechanisms with rhabdoviruses and
paramyxoviruses.16Molecular structure of EV
The genome of EV consists of a single-stranded RNA
approximately 19,000 nucleotides long. The Ebola genome
has 7 known nucleotide sequences that code for structural and
nonstructural proteins also known as viral proteins (VPs). The
core of the virus is made up of RNA genomic molecules
comprised of nucleoprotein.19 There are several types of VPs,
each with a different function. VP30 plays an important role
in RNA transcription activation, which is strongly dependent
on the concentration of VP30. VP24, which is the primary
matrix protein, is also the most abundant virion component.
Its role is unclear. VP35 plays an important role in viral RNA
synthesis. It acts as a type of interferon antagonist. There is a
very strong possibility that the potency of VP35 could account
for the varying degrees of virulence among different strains of
EV.20 VP40 is a matrix protein from the negative strand
of RNA. It mainly participates in the assembly of lipid-
enveloped viruses by providing a link between the surrounding
membrane and the nucleocapsid structure. The protein, also
known as single-surface transmembrane glycoprotein, forms
spikes on virions and plays an important role in viral entry
into cells by mediating receptor binding, fusion, and entry
into the target cell.19
Immunosuppression caused by EV is largely attributed to
a section of the glycoprotein (G1 and G2) that shares a
striking homology with another immunosuppressive protein
found in oncogenic retroviruses.20 This particular sequence is
thought to aid EV in evading the human immune responses
in addition to suppressing MHC. The L protein, an RNA-
dependent RNA polymerase, plays an essential role in cata-
lyzing transcription.19,21-23
FIG 2. Viral assembly model of Ebola virus. Viral mRNA transcribed from genomic negative-sense RNA is
released into the cytoplasm, where VPs are translated. Nucleoprotein, together with VP35, VP40, VP30, and
VP24, forms small inclusions (A), which become larger near the nucleus (B). At the edge of the inclusion
bodies, the nucleocapsid (NC) is formed. VP40 associates with the NC, contributing to its transport to the
plasma membrane (C1). Alternatively, nucleocapside initially associates with a few VP40 molecules and
then moves to the plasma membrane, where it is enveloped with membrane-associated VP40 (C2). Synthe-
sized glycoprotein (GP) is independently transported to the plasma membrane (D). The viral components
then assemble, and the progeny virions bud (E). ER, Endoplasmic reticulum. Reprinted with permission
from Nanbo et al.21
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is activated by the VPs that contain the nucleoprotein.24,25
When compared with Marburg virus, the N-terminal region of
nucleoprotein defines the inner diameter of the EV nucleocapside,
whereas the RNA genome defines its length.26 The details of viral
assembly are summarized in Fig 2.Transmission and transmission dynamics
Ebola hemorrhagic fever is a classic zoonosis with persistence
of EV in a reservoir species thought to be rodents and bats.27 Bats
are present in large numbers at the sites of several outbreaks and
are known to maintain other pathogenic RNA viruses, such as
rabies. EV antibodies have been measured in fruit bats.28
However, the virus has never been isolated from these animals.
It is supposed that EV might persist as an asymptomatic or
subclinical infection in the reservoir species, with little or no
transmission, and is only activated by appropriated stimulus (ie,
stress and coinfection).29,30 Apes, humans, and other mammalianspecies that are susceptible to EV infection are regarded as end
hosts.29
An outbreak of Ebola virus disease (EVD) typically
begins through human contact with an infected animal.30 These
transmissions might be an infrequent event, probably also
underreported, given the restricted contact with the reservoir
species.29 Once the first human is infected, the disease
spreads to other human subjects through direct contact with
blood and body fluids of sick patients or persons who have died
from EVD.
The most infectious body fluids are blood, feces, and vomit,31
although other fluids, such as urine, saliva, breast milk, semen,
and, theoretically, sweat, can also contribute to transmission
because EV has been isolated from these fluids. The likelihood
of transmission depends on the type of exposure and the viral
load. Therefore transmission is unlikely during the incubation
period,32 and the risk is highest during contact with very sick
patients and dead bodies. Health care workers caring for patients
with EVD are at high risk of infection if they do not use
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nificant role in the spread of infection in many EVoutbreaks.32-34
Other routes of transmission might include contact with
contaminated surfaces or objects because the virus can persist
for hours or days.35 There is no evidence that EV transmission can
spread from human to human through the respiratory route.35FIG 3. Pathogenesis of Ebola at the cellular level. GP, Glycoprotein.Pathogenesis
Most insights into the pathogenesis of Ebola stem from animal
data because the traditionally remote location of the outbreaks
and the varying nature of the associated emergency responses and
cautious handling of highly contagious specimens in high-
containment laboratories make in-depth immunopathogenesis
studies in human subjects very difficult.
Serosurveys conducted in the region suggest that EV has been
endemic in equatorial Africa at least during the last decades36 and
specifically in West Africa for about a decade.37 Therefore it is
likely that asymptomatic infections can occur in some subjects.38
However, the factors determining the spectrum and range of
clinical symptoms from mild to severe manifestations are not
well understood at present. Larger seroprevalence surveys in the
affected populations and detailed host studies during the time of
an epidemic would be mandatory to understand factors
influencing susceptibility and possibly protection.
It is well established that the virus enters through mucous
membranes or cuts and abrasions in contact with infected
materials, such as blood, sweat, urine, and other secretions.
Ingestion of contaminated food with high viral titers might also
play a role.18 EV can infect a wide range of cell types, with a
preference for rapid replication in monocytes, macrophages,
and dendritic cells,39 from which the infection spreads through
the lymphatic system and hematogenously. Although not a direct
target of infection, large numbers of lymphocytes apoptose and
release soluble factors, triggering the inflammatory cascade and
causing damage to the endothelial system.40,41 The exact
mechanisms causing the substantial epithelial damage leading
to disseminated intravascular coagulopathy and hypotensive
shock are incompletely understood. EV replication and
ongoing infection lead to extensive necrosis of adrenocortical
cells, with a subsequent effect on steroid synthesis, blood pressure
regulation, and loss of sodium, resulting in hypovolemic shock.42
Coagulopathy is a key feature of advanced Ebola disease and is
induced by the strong proinflammatory response from monocytes
and macrophages, as well as possibly deficiencies in production
of liver-derived clotting factors because of liver cell necrosis.
The immune mechanisms involved are illustrated in more detail
in Fig 3.
The infection of antigen-presenting cells with EV triggers a
strong inflammatory response, and clinical outcome depends on
the extent of the host’s counterregulatory response. An increase in
nitric oxide levels has been associated with poor outcome.43
According to data from Uganda, HLA alleles B*67 and B*15
were associated with fatal outcomes, whereas B*07 and B*14
were associated with nonfatal outcomes, but this has not been
confirmed in West Africa at present.44DIAGNOSIS
After a median incubation period of 2 to 10 days, the abrupt
onset of Ebola hemorrhagic fever is characterized by fever,myalgias, chills, and malaise. The initial diagnosis is often made
on clinical grounds in the context of a history of exposure. EV
infection is then confirmed in national or international reference
laboratories by identifying the viral genome in the blood of
patients by using RT-PCR techniques or viral detection
ELISAs.45,46 The host response can be measured as the IgM
and later IgG antibody response by using ELISA techniques.
In nonfatal cases the increase in antibody titers around day 6 to
11 accompanies the recovery. The development of antigen-
specific IgM and then IgG is accompanied by strong
inflammatory responses, including TNF-a and IL-6 production.
Whether these are markers of disease activity or have protective
potential remains to be established. IgG antibodies are known to
persist for many years after infection.47,48 Although highly
accurate, the currently used diagnostic tests have significant
logistic challenges, including the requirements for high-level
laboratory biosafety and staff with expertise in using
sophisticated machines.
Once in the laboratory, each analysis takes between 2 and 6
hours, and the costs of around US$100 per sample are difficult to
meet in resource-constrained West African settings, thus severely
limiting testing capacity. Lost time means that infected persons
might remain in the community, with a severe risk of unknow-
ingly transmitting the virus to others. Moreover, in the absence of
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infectious diseases, such as malaria or dengue, and similar early
symptomsmight be unjustifiably held in an Ebola ‘‘transit’’ center
as a precautionary measure and are thus at risk of contracting
Ebola.
In October 2014, the World Health Organization (WHO)
launched an initiative to stimulate diagnostic innovations to bring
novel accurate tests to the point-of-care level. Decreasing the
turnaround time for diagnosis through such assays would allow
triaging and treating appropriate patients as swiftly as possible.
The 2 key initiatives aim to rapidly solicit products that meet a
prespecified ‘‘ideal profile’’ of the next generation of diagnostic
tests and to provide a rapid review process for assessing a
diagnostic test’s quality, safety, and performance.49
Patients with severe disease and often fatal outcomes progress
tomultisystem involvement, including gastrointestinal (vomiting,
diarrhea) and pulmonary symptoms, such as breathlessness and
cough. A maculopapular rash has been reported around day 5 to 7
of the illness. The most feared symptoms of widespread
hemorrhages from various mucous membranes and disseminated
intravascular coagulopathy accompany the devastating
multiorgan failure at the peak of viremia and ultimately lead to
the death of the infected patient from hypovolemic shock unless
comprehensive supportive therapy can be offered in time.50,51
Abnormal laboratory parameters include leukopenia and
lymphopenia, increased liver and pancreatic enzyme levels,
abnormal clotting results, and renal failure, all of which are
indicative of a severe multisystem disorder with a high rate of
fatality.52
Death rates have varied between 40% and 80% at various times
during the current epidemic50,51 and might be more reflective of
the available support measures than differences in host
susceptibility or acquisition of immunity on a larger scale. Delay
in diagnosis, presentation at an already advanced stage of disease,
and absence of treatment centers were clearly associated with
higher death rates than have been reported lately. However, the
more recent reports reflect primarily treatment center–associated
deaths, whereas there are less survival data frommore rural areas,
which might not yet have received the same level of support.
However, judging by previous epidemics and current observa-
tions, it is practically certain that differences in host susceptibility
and response to infection and therapy exist, which, if better
defined through research conducted in the context of the outbreak
situation, might help to develop prognostic markers and tailored
interventions.
Time of presentation, viral load, general state of the patient by
the time of arrival at a treatment center, and possibly age and
comorbidities can all influence the ultimate outcome of the
disease in a subject.THERAPEUTIC INTERVENTIONS
The current recommendations for treatment of Ebola comprise
the administration of sufficient fluids (oral or intravenously) to
maintain circulatory stability, exclusion or treatment of malaria,
and administration of broad-spectrum antibiotics to treat
potential concomitant bacterial infections, antipyretics, and
analgesia.53
No results from randomized controlled trials (RCTs)
comparing different interventions and protocols are available at
this point in time. It is widely acknowledged that supportive carehas differed between sites and patient populations, varying
from basic oral rehydration to intravenous fluid resuscitation.
Whether the routine use of antibiotics makes a significant
contribution to outcome is unclear. The role of oral potassium
supplementation in the absence of close electrolyte
monitoring and use of antidiarrheal agents also remains to be
established.
The pressure on materials, facilities, and skilled personnel in
the endemic areas has limited the supportive care that can be
provided in this emergency situation when compared with the
care delivered to personnel with Ebola infection who were
expatriated to resource-rich settings in Europe and North
America. Not surprisingly, death rates in the context of modern
intensive care have been much lower, as long as the patients
arrived at earlier stages of the disease. Beyond these very basic
supportive therapies, some experimental treatments have been
used on some patients with various success.54
By December 2014, several hundred patients were expected to
take part in 3 separate trials in early 2015 conducted at Medecins
Sans Frontieres–run Ebola treatment centers in Guinea and
Liberia. The different objectives are to test the administration of
antibodies from the blood of Ebola survivors to neutralize EV in
the patients (passive immunization) or to interfere with transcrip-
tion and replication of the EV by using antivirals, which have
shown promise in other viral diseases.
The 2 leading antiviral candidates are brincidofovir (Chimerix,
Durham, NC) and favipiravir (Fujifilm, Toyama Chemical,
Tokyo, Japan). Brincidofovir is currently in phase III clinical
trials for use in human subjects against cytomegalovirus (CMV)
and adenovirus after successful testing for safety in more than
1000 human subjects54 and has received US Food and
Drug Administration Fast Track Designation for treatment of
CMV, adenovirus, and smallpox.55 On October 6, 2014, Chimerix
received a US Food and Drug Administration authorization
for emergency investigational new drug applications of brincido-
fovir for the treatment of EVD, but of late, the company has
decided to focus their efforts on its use in CMV and adenovirus
infections.
Favipiravir is an experimental antiviral drug being developed
by Toyama Chemical of Japan with activity against many RNA
viruses, including influenza.56,57 At the time of writing, clinical
trials of this drug have started in Guinea, with more than 100
patients already enrolled.
Further therapeutic interventions could also relate to products
for correcting the coagulopathy seen in patients with severe Ebola
disease,58 but no clinical trials are announced at present.Prioritized use of experimental drugs in the face of
limited supply
Because of the life-threatening situation during EV outbreaks
and the absence of known treatments, experimental therapies are
being deployed for compassionate use. In line with the principles
of reciprocity, health workers infected with EVare currently given
higher consideration to access the scarce drugs. Although
understandable, this practice can promote distrust in health care
systems and potentially undermine the social value of clinical
research involving the experimental therapies. Therefore it
remains critical that fair selection of beneficiaries of the
unproved interventions should be transparently and consistently
practiced.59
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At the time of writing, there was no licensed vaccine against
EV, although clinical trials have now commenced in the United
States, Europe, andWest Africa, and preliminary results on safety
and immunogenicity are becoming available. Despite existence of
promising vaccine candidates, the low incidence and sporadic
nature of outbreaks of Ebola, largely limited to a few countries in
Central and East Africa, have discouraged pharmaceutical
companies frommaking huge investments into their development
and testing.60 This situation has dramatically changed with the
unprecedented outbreak in West Africa.61 The sheer scale of the
global health concerns has finally energized a consortium of
pharmaceutical companies, researchers, and funders to prioritize
the clinical development of Ebola vaccines. The first goal of this
concerted effort is to protect the frontline health workers who are
at increased risk of infections and death when providing care for
patients.59 This is ultimately planned to be extended to the
affected countries in an exceptionally fast-tracked process in
which vaccine development, testing, and licensure take place in
parallel. Because speed is the goal for Ebola vaccine development
and rollout, a number of challenges need to be pragmatically
addressed to achieve this lofty objective. Table I62 shows an
updated profile of 2 leading candidate Ebola vaccines and others
in development.Changing dogma to accelerate development of
vaccines and therapeutics
The utmost urgency required to effectively contain the
epidemic has dramatically changed the perception of the need
for an Ebola vaccine, and the global response has resulted in
substantial funds being released for Ebola.63 This development is
accompanied by renewed interest from researchers and
pharmaceutical companies. Interestingly, some drug companies
have insisted on securing indemnity from government against
loss or damages that might follow use of the products developed
from fast-tracked clinical trials.64Removing obstacles to accelerate the pace of Ebola
vaccine and treatment trials
The conduct of clinical trials is commonly characterized by
complex heterogeneous, expensive, and time-consuming
approval processes,65,66 and monitoring usually concentrates on
retrospective data verification. However, in the current context a
risk-based approach to monitoring of clinical trials with emphasis
on centralized monitoring is being encouraged.
In this context regular review of emerging safety data by
independent data and safety monitoring committees needs to
remain the highest priority, and emerging data should be
appropriately shared with regulatory authorities.67 The notion
of a single submission point for clinical trial authorization with
defined timelines for approval would further support these efforts.ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE SEARCH FOR EFFECTIVE
EBOLA CONTROL
Since the launch of global efforts to accelerate initiatives to
identify potent vaccines to control the scourge of Ebola, there
have been growing controversies about the appropriate study
design to adopt in achieving this.68,69 Although RCTs are widelyaccepted as the gold standard to provide credible evidence for
vaccine efficacy and subsequent licensing, experts have argued
that RCTs are ethically inappropriate because of the lack of
effective Ebola treatments, very high mortality rate, and almost
comatose health systems in the affected countries. The experts
proposed a parallel evaluation of different experimental
interventions at different sites while concurrently documenting
mortality rates after use of ‘‘standard’’ care.69 An emerging
body of knowledge advocates a prospective cohort, stepped-
wedge design. This design is used when ethical, financial, or
logistic constraints prevent the use of individual RCTs.70,71 In
this design experimental vaccines/interventional treatments
would be sequentially rolled out randomly to communities as
they become available. Time periods before the community
intervention serve as controls, and efficacy is estimated based
on having concurrent preintervention and postintervention
follow-up time periods.71 This approach requires close
interactions with major stakeholders, including regulators,
investigators, affected communities, and the WHO. If backed
with robust data collection, this design could be acceptable to
regulators to support licensure. It also offers a unique opportunity
for governments, manufacturers, Ebola-affected countries, and
funders to work harmoniously together to develop a viable
vaccine or treatment that could make the present Ebola epidemic
the last in medical history.62 Apart from this approach, a
ring-vaccination strategy is also planned to evaluate Ebola
vaccine in an affected West African country. In line with this
strategy, when an Ebola case is confirmed, the affected patient’s
family members, friends, neighbors, and community will be
vaccinated, thereby forming a ring of resistance around the
patient to prevent further spread of the infection. This strategy
was successfully used to eradicate smallpox globally.72
Because no human data exist on Ebola vaccine efficacy, the
adaptive, randomized, observer-blind, controlled trial design still
remains attractive because it is themost powerful scientific design
for detection of vaccine efficacy and begins with truly randomized
groups. This adaptive design allows for discontinuation of the
control arm (or vaccination) based on predefined event-driven
analyses of near-real time data collected during the trial.73ANTHROPOLOGIC AND HEALTH SYSTEM
FACTORS IN EBOLA CONTROL
The role of anthropologic factors in triggering Ebola outbreaks
in remote Sub-Saharan Africa settings is well recognized.
Because of apparent food insecurity and poverty, wildlife
animals, including bats and nonhuman primates, are frequently
hunted for subsistence and trade.74 This anthropogenic activity
amplifies human exposure to pernicious zoonosis because deadly
viruses harbored by these animals can easily be transmitted to
human subjects when their carcasses are being processed for
human consumption.75 Although the mechanism underlying
animal-to-human transmission it is not entirely clear, most Ebola
outbreaks to date are traceable to a single index case who (or
whose family members) had contact with carcasses of bats or
nonhuman primates in impoverished remote African villages
with obvious food insecurity.18,76
Once an outbreak has been initiated, spread is often enhanced
by an array of cultural beliefs and practices, including adherence
to time-honored paradigms of health and illness. Most of these
paradigms ascribe diseases to supernatural or evil forces and have
TABLE I. Profile of ongoing and anticipated candidate Ebola vaccines trial
Vaccine type Manufacturers
Vaccination
approach/target
Progress (including
success in animal
studies) Future plans Issues and concerns
Current trials on candidate Ebola vaccines
ChAd3-ZEBOV:
Chimpanzee
adenovirus serotype
3 encoding the
monovalent Zaire
strain of EV
glycoprotein
GlaxoSmithKline,
Research Triangle
Park, NC; National
Institutes of Health,
Bethesda, Md
Pre-exposure for
frontline health
workers
Phase I trials are nearing
completion in the
United Kingdom and
Mali.
Parallel phase II/III trials
are planned to start in
Liberia or Sierra
Leone in early 2015.
ChAd3 are genetically
modified vectors with
biosafety level 2
status. The vaccine is
administered
intravenously and
requires storage at
2808C.
ChAd3-EBO:
Chimpanzee
adenovirus serotype
3 encoding bivalent
Sudan and Zaire
EV glycoproteins
GlaxoSmithKline,
National Institutes of
Health
Pre-exposure for
frontline health
workers
Preliminary findings of
phase I trial in the
United States showed
promising safety and
immunogenic
profiles.62
Expanded phase I/Ib
trials for dose
selection, efficacy
evaluation, and MVA-
EBO booster regimen
are planned for 2015.
Current epidemic in
West Africa is caused
by the Zaire strain,
limiting possible
deployment in the
event of proved
efficacy.
rVSV-EBOV: Attenu-
ated version of
recombinant vesi-
cular stomatitis
virus expressing
EV glycoprotein
NewLink Genetics,
Ames, Iowa (Public
Health Agency of
Canada’s National
Microbiology
Laboratory [NML]).
Postexposure Has demonstrated
efficacy in rodents and
nonhuman primates;
however, it currently
trails behind ChAd3-
ZEBOV in phase I
trials. Report of
arthralgia among
volunteers in a Swiss
trial led to a
temporary halt.
Concurrent efficacy
trials along with
ChAd3-ZEBOV in
worst-hit countries
Efficacy is likely to
depend on filovirus
species and early
commencement of
intervention after
exposure.
Anticipated Ebola vaccine trials
Ad 25, Ad 35, MVA
candidates: Heter-
ologous prime-
boost approach
using human
adenoviruses 25
and 35 and MVA
vectors
Johnson & Johnson,
New Brunswick, NJ;
Bavarian Nordic,
Kvistgaard, Denmark
Pre-exposure Has shown demonstrated
efficacy in rodents and
nonhuman primates.
Phase I trials are
planned for early
2015.
Will depend on phase I
data
High pre-existing
antibody against
human adenovirus
vectors
Recombinant protein–
Ebola glycoprotein
Protein Sciences Pre-exposure Has demonstrated
efficacy in rodents.
Human trials are
scheduled in 2015.
Will depend on phase I
data
Limited safety data in
human subjects
EBOV GP Vaccine:
Recombinant nano-
particle using adju-
vant Matrix-M: first
Ebola vaccine
candidate based on
the 2014 Guinea
Ebola strain genetic
sequence
Novavax, Gaithersburg,
Md
Pre-exposure Robust immune
responses
demonstrated in
preclinical studies;
exceptional responses
were seen when used
with Novavax Matrix-
M adjuvant.
Nonhuman primate
study was initiated.
GMP manufacture
was initiated. Scaled-
up manufacturing is to
begin in first quarter
of 2015. Phase 1
clinical trial is
anticipated to start in
December 2014.
Will depend on phase I
data
Limited safety data on
Matrix-M adjuvant in
human subjects
(Continued)
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TABLE I. (Continued)
Vaccine type Manufacturers
Vaccination
approach/target
Progress (including
success in animal
studies) Future plans Issues and concerns
Oral Ad5: Oral tablet
vaccine based on
human adenovirus
Vaxart, South San
Francisco, Calif
Pre-exposure Protective against
challenge in
preclinical studies;
clinical trials are
anticipated in early
2015.
Will depend on phase I
data
High pre-existing
antibody against
human adenovirus
vectors
rVSV-EBOV: Another
vesicular stomatitis
vector based
vaccine
Profectus Biosciences,
Baltimore, Md
Pre-exposure Safety data are available
in this vaccine
component expressing
HIV gag. Phase I
trials are planned for
second quarter of
2015.
Will depend on phase I
data
Safety issue as vaccine is
replication competent
DNA-EBOV: Multi-
agent filovirus
DNA vaccine
delivered by means
of intramuscular
electroporation
Inovio, San Diego, Calif Pre-exposure and
postexposure
Phase I trials in 2015 Will depend on phase I
data
Limited safety data and
delivery challenges
Recombinant rabies
EBOV: (chemically
inactivated [killed]
rabies virus virions
containing EBOV
glycoprotein)
National Institutes of
Health
Pre-exposure and
postexposure
Excellent protection in
mice against lethal
challenge with the
mouse adapted EBOV
and RABV; phase I
trials will occur in
2015.
Will depend on phase I
data
No safety data in human
subjects
Three potential vac-
cines: Triazoverin
based on an EV
strain and the other
2 based on recom-
binant mAbs
Russian Ministry of
Health, Moscow,
Russia
Preventive and
therapeutic
Efficiency is said to
range between 70%
and 90%. There are
plans to send the
vaccines to affected
West African
countries by
December 2014.
Will depend on phase I
data
No safety data in human
subjects
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appease gods and ancestors.77
In the context of Ebola outbreaks, afflicted communities
ascribe the disease to evil spirits, witchcraft, or sorcery. These
views lead many to seek care from traditional or spiritual healers,
who in turn use unsafe practices to treat patients. In many
outbreaks traditional treatment homes have served as epicenters
for disease propagation.78,79
Mistrust of governments and foreign workers has helped to fan
transmission chains in communities, where containment teams
have been blamed for initiating and spreading the disease.80
These misconceptions have rendered dozens of affected villages
inaccessible and have led to the destruction of treatment units81
and physical attacks on containment teams, including butchering
of staff.6 Additionally, intense disease transmission in hospitals
has further amplified mistrust of authorities when communities
view hospitals as institutions that kill more than they cure. Fearful
patients subsequently absconded from treatment units, and
families resisted taking patients to hospitals, thus enhancing
disease propagation in the communities. In West African settings
unauthorized collections of money for obtaining death certificates
has emerged to enable families to bury their loved ones in local
graves.82Burial rites and mourning ceremonies appear to be the most
significant drivers of the disease. In some settings they account
for roughly two thirds of all new cases.34 The risk is high
because these ceremonies, which bring hundreds of persons
in close contacts with highly infectious corpses, most
often require people to follow long-standing rituals, including
keeping corpses for 3 days and communal hand washing in
water that was used to bathe corpses.79 In an attempt to limit
transmissions during funerals, WHO has developed recom-
mendations on safe burial practices. However, uptake of these
recommendations are disappointing because many families
decline offers for safe burials.5 The low uptake hindered
achieving the United Nations target of safely burying 70% of
victims by the end of 2014.
Amajor obstacle to implementation is the profound view about
life after death held in some communities. In many cultures the
goal of life is to become an ancestor in the spirit world or to join
the creator in heaven. ‘‘Proper burials’’ are mandatory require-
ments for achieving this goal.83 Therefore the dead must be
prepared and buried in a prescribed way, whichmust be supported
by numerous religious rites. According to these beliefs, the person
might be subjected to severe torture, rejected by the ancestors, or
transformed into wandering ghosts or totems if these rules are not
FIG 4. Summary of the potential strategies and intervention points for social and biological scientists to
achieve a holistic approach to Ebola control.
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864 ROCA ET ALfollowed. In some cultures improper burials are only reserved for
witches and sorcerers, whose bodies are sometime subjected to
burning, fed to carnivores, or secretly disposed of in isolated
places and away from family graves. In previous outbreaks
thoughts of being buried in plastic bags at isolated places by
unfamiliar persons and in the absence of relatives and traditional
rituals scared patients and families away from seeking health care
or even notifying the authorities of Ebola-related deaths in
communities.84
To address these issues, cultural paradigms must be
acknowledged, and management must be incorporated into
Ebola preparedness plans. As seen in Uganda, some of these
paradigms contain elements, such as isolation of cases,
restrictions on gatherings, and safe burial practices, which
are consistent with modern principles of infectious disease
control.33 Aligning such containment strategies to existing
helpful paradigms has proved useful in controlling deadly
epidemics.85 This experience highlights the need for
replication of similar studies in other African settings. Such
knowledge might prove useful in designing and delivering
messages that can inspire cognitive and behavioral changes
to time-honored practices.HEALTH SYSTEM FACTORS
The significant gaps in each of the 6 building blocks of a
functional health care system faced by most Sub-Saharan African
nations28 can hamper Ebola containment efforts in several ways.
The asymmetric distribution of health services has created
significant disparities in health equity and access in many rural
areas, where most outbreaks occur. Lack of basic health
infrastructure, medical supplies, and trained personnel render
the quantity and quality of health service delivery in these areasdisproportionate to health needs and affect health-seeking
behavior.31
Second, most countries lack laboratory capacity, which can
provide rapid confirmation of Ebola.86 During the early phase of
an outbreak, samples are often shipped to distant countries for
confirmation of Ebola, resulting in delayed response strategies.
Third, surveillance systems and quarantine mechanisms are
weak, hindering contact tracing and monitoring efforts.
Furthermore, health information systems are failing to deliver timely
and reliable information that can guide containment strategies.
Most of these limitations are a result of limited health care
resources. In many Sub-Saharan African nations there are less
than 0.4 physicians and 1 bed for every 1000 population, and
health expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product
hardly exceed 5%.35 This situation is even worse in
Ebola-stricken nations because their health systems are plagued
by diverse levels of dysfunction, including the inability to
maintain adequate infection control. Poor infection control
mechanisms have led to the infection and depletion of the nations’
already scarce health workforce.87CONTROL MEASURES
Strengthening health systems and practicing safe
burials
For an outbreak to be effectively controlled and eventually
come to an end, control measures need to be rapidly
implemented to guarantee that each affected patient infects
less than 1 case (R < 1). In the absence of licensed novel
treatments and vaccines, control of the epidemic relies on
nonpharmaceutical interventions, which include quick identi-
fication and isolation of cases, control measures in hospital
settings, identification and follow-up of contacts, and, very
Box 1. Priority areas for future research
d Identification of surrogate markers for transmission that can be
traced through bodily fluids in order to detect infection before pre-
senting symptoms
d Development of new diagnostics that can identify infected pa-
tients before the onset of clinical symptoms
d Host immune mechanisms involved in viral shedding rate or dis-
ease susceptibility (HIV and other coinfections)
d Asymptomatic infections: correlates of protection/severity
d Effect of genetic modification of the virus on the potential for
changes in transmissibility
d Development of appropriate strategies for communicating risk
factors and evaluation of the effect of such strategies on miti-
gating virus transmission
d Contact tracing strategies
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factors contributed to stopping transmission, including leader-
ship and clear designation of authorities, organization, coordi-
nation (assuring international and local support), logistics, and
communication.17 Several subsequent epidemics used field
teams with experience in containing other outbreaks, such as
measles or polio, to trace primary contacts of patients with
Ebola because they are trained for rigorous identification and
surveillance. Because the virus is not transmitted through air
or water, stopping transmission should be feasible when the
cases are detected early and managed properly.35 However,
burials have effectively served as super-spreader events.
Culturally sensitive burials and disposal of cadavers are
needed.14 Efforts are ongoing to assess previously successful
strategies in the current epidemic. Some mathematic models
have quantified the risk of transmission stratified in the
different contexts (ie, hospital and community15) and within
the community between sick patients and burials.14 In the
past, changes in behavior led to a significant reduction both
in hospital-to-community and within-community transmis-
sion.17 However, reducing transmission in hospitals would
not be enough now. The most effective means to control the
current epidemic require a combined strategy of intensifying
contract tracing to remove infected persons in the community
at an early stage of the development of symptoms, provide
both isolation and care,15 and achieve sanitary burials.14
Models predict that the epidemic could be stopped by full
alignment of these strategies with an efficacy of 60% for
each of them if all were implemented.14 If only individual stra-
tegies were applied, these would need to achieve greater than
90% efficacy to control the current outbreak in West Africa.14
The experience in developed countries has shown that with
appropriate resources, case mortality of EV infection can be
decreased.3 Because burials are key in the transmission of
the virus, the improvement of clinical care that would lead to
decreased mortality would favor control of the epidemic.
Improvement in clinical care would also help re-establish the
confidence of affected communities in health services. Fig 4 il-
lustrates potential strategies and intervention points to achieve
a holistic approach to Ebola control.Mandatory or self-quarantine of health workers
returning from Ebola-affected countries
The heroic efforts of international volunteers working in
Ebola-hit countries have been widely acknowledged in the
containment of the epidemic. Although many of the personnel
sacrifice their lives in the process, others who successfully
served in the affected areas face discrimination and
stigmatization on return to their home countries. This is fueled
by the notion that the returning volunteers might be incubating
EV and could potentially be a source of infection to the
community. Contrary to well-known evidence, a study
suggested that asymptomatic subjects could be a significant
threat of infection because EV could persist in the blood of
asymptomatic infected subjects for 2 weeks after they were
first exposed to an infected person.38 However, a comprehen-
sive analysis of 25 EV outbreaks since its first occurrence in
1976 showed that contact with an asymptomatic subjects is
not a risk factor for transmitting the virus.88 Therefore daily
reporting of body temperature is considered adequate to detectthe onset of disease, and this could be done by the volunteers
in the spirit of mutual respect and agreement rather than
subjecting them to mandatory quarantine.CONCLUSION
Despite the huge potential of proved drugs or vaccines in
curbing the menace of EVD, it remains crucial that strengthening
of existing health systems and acknowledging and incorporating
cultural beliefs and practices in containment strategies in the
affected regions take higher priority (Fig 4).89,90 In the longer
term only functioning health systems are capable of overcoming
the enormous challenges of EV containment and preventing
future outbreaks supported by results from international research
efforts (Box 1).91REFERENCES
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